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1 #+title: Thoughts on Patents
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2 #+author: Robert McIntyre
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3 #+email: rlm@mit.edu
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4 #+description:
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5 #+keywords:
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6 #+SETUPFILE: ../../aurellem/org/setup.org
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7 #+INCLUDE: ../../aurellem/org/level-0.org
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8
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9
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10 (This is all based on my knowledge of American patent/copyright law.)
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11
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12 * Copyright is normally a negative force
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13
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14 Copyright is something the you are automatically granted whenever
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15 you create a work in some permanent form; you don't have to request
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16 it or anything. It lets you prevent other people from copying your
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17 work, reading your work, or creating derivitave works based on your
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18 work.
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19
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20
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21 * GPL uses copyright as a positive force
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22
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23 * Patents generally an inhibitive force.
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24
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25 Patents are usually a negative force, one that allows you to stop
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26 other entities from using knowledge to their own advantage.
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27
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28 * Google has created "neutral" patents via a pledge which attaches conditions to its patents.
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29 Google has a pledge at
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30 http://www.google.com/patents/opnpledge/pledge/ that says that for
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31 certain specified patents "we pledge not to sue any user,
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32 distributor or developer of open-source software on specified
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33 patents, unless first attacked."
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34
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35 This is an interesting statement to me. With this pledge, Google has
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36 created "neutral" patents that allow open source software to
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37 develop, but do not particurally encourage it to develop. They have
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38 done this by attaching legally binding conditions on the enforcement
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39 of their patents via a pledge.
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40
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41 * Positive Patents
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42 We can create patents that actively encourage openness by emulating
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43 the GPL. What it would take is a company that issues a more
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44 agressive pledge about its patents; Something along the lines of:
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45
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46 #+begin_quote
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47 The Positive Patent Pledge, v0.1
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48
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49 "We pledge to sue any entity that tries to sell/distribute any
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50 product that is covered by our patents. We will not settle for any
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51 amount of money but will instead ensure that the product will never
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52 see market, as is our right under patent law.
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53
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54 The only exception is if the product is open (all code/methods of
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55 construction is made pubically available under an open license), and
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56 the entity makes this same pledge for any patents relating to the
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57 product."
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58 #+end_quote
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59
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60 This pledge, if taken by a company with enough patents, would slowly
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61 destroy the patent system by contaminating the entire patent network
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62 with patents that infect all dependent patents with this
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63 pledge. Companies that are considering patenting something will
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64 think twice, since they don't want to be responsible for costly
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65 legal battles with no monetary reward. They would be better off
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66 releasing their work to the public domain than patenting it.
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67
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68 How might this hypothetical company (which is basically a noble
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69 patent trolling company) gain control of patents? They could use the
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70 normal patent troll methods of buying bulk patents from companies
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71 that are going out of business. However, they could also gather
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72 patents from individuals and companies who believe that the patent
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73 system is harmful to innovation, and simply donate their patents to
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74 the cause.
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75
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76 How could this get enough money to fight these legal battles?
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77 Perhaps there could be a possibility of settling for money and
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78 requiring the company to make their relevant patents merely neutral
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79 instead of positive. Then, the positive patent pledge could read:
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80
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81 #+begin_quote
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82 The Positive Patent Pledge v0.2
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83
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84 "We pledge to sue any entity that tries to sell/distribute any
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85 product that is covered by our patents. We will not settle for any
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86 amount of money but will instead ensure that the product will never
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87 see market, as is our right under patent law.
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88
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89 The only exception is if the product is open (all code/methods of
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90 construction is made pubically available under an open license), and
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91 the entity makes this same pledge for any patents relating to the
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92 product, the entity can take the Google 'neutral patent pledge'
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93 instead of this pledge if they are a 'special exception'.
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94 #+end_quote
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95
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96 The only way for a company to become a special exception would be
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97 for them to contribute monetairly to this hypothetical company.
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98
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99
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